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Abstract. This study aims to investigate the effect of political uncertainty as a determinant 
of investment decisions on investment decisions of firms. For this purpose, this study 
involves 147 BIST (Istanbul Stock Exchange) listed firms displaying activity in the 
industry sector between 2008 and 2013. Panel data analysis with relevant quarterly data 
was used to analyze the relationship between political uncertainty and investment decisions 
of firms. Analysis results have revealed a statistically significant relationship between 
investments of firms and the variable representing 29 March 2009 General Local Elections, 
12 June 2011 General Elections and 12 September 2010 New Constitution Referendum as 
an indicator of political uncertainty. This verifies the argument suggesting an uncertainty 
due to elections may negatively affect investments of firms through inefficient capital 
allocation, and this can be said to provide a strong message with regard to important 
economic effects of political uncertainty. 
Keywords. Political uncertainty, Elections, Firm investments. 
JEL. D92, E21. 
 
1. Introduction 
n important way of investigating effects of political factors on real 
economic decisions is making use of political uncertainty and instability 
channels. Incentives and uncertainty are associated with a possible change 
in governmental policies. Effects of political uncertainty are better comprehended 
following the recent financial crisis and recession. A great uncertainty may be 
present regarding what governments will do to increase investments in the short-
term and to develop an economic policy in the long-term (see also Unver  
Erdogan, 2015). There is a discussion on whether such uncertainty causes 
postponements of investment decisions of firms and the fact that these firms will 
not make investments unless required financial regulations are made and 
uncertainty regarding macroeconomic policies are eliminated restrains a possible 
economic recovery. Many studies show that political uncertainty increases during 
national election periods. For instance, Bialkowskiet. al. (2008) has shown that 
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market indexes are more variable during election periods, and Boutchkova et. al. 
(2012) has reported that sectors which are more sensitive politically have less 
estimated cash flows again during election periods. Mei  Guo (2004) have 
discovered that stock markets were more variable at the time of election during the 
1998 Asia financial crisis period. 
A number of recent studies (Baker et. al., 2013; Gulen  Ion, 2013; Julio  
Yook, 2012, and Durnev, 2012) have attributed the decrease in investment 
expenses of firms during the global financial crisis to the rising political 
uncertainty. Among these studies, Julio  Yook (2012) and Durnev (2012) used 
presidency election, general election and local election periods as political 
uncertainty criteria.  Baker et. al. (2013) and Gulen  Ion (2013) used the political 
uncertainty index developed by Baker et. al. (2013). This study uses a dummy 
variable representing 29 March 2009 General Local Elections, 12 September 2010 
New Constitution Referendum and 12 June 2011 General Elections periods as an 
indicator of political uncertainty in accordance with Julio  Yook (2012) and 
Durnev (2012). In general, the elections are important for the stability of the 
political system. Additionally, a high electoral participation is an important 
indicator of the confidence of citizens in the democratic institutions (Yılmaz, 
2013). A literature review did not return a study on firm-based effects of political 
uncertainty in Turkey on investment decisions of firms. The current study aims to 
fill a gap in the literature regarding how political uncertainty within the context of 
national elections affects investment decisions in terms of firms.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Uncertainty increases the value of waiting for investment according to the “bad 
news principle” of Bernanke (1983). An increase in uncertainty will cause a 
decrease in current investments if a bad outcome is likely. During national election 
periods, firms will postpone their investments in case a negative change occurs 
regarding macroeconomic, tax or monetary policies of the relevant country. 
However, sometimes election results can be viewed as good news regardless of the 
winner of the election. As an example, if the ruling government has fallen or 
insufficient, firms do not reduce their investments, thinking that election results 
would be better than the current situation. In this case, bad news principle is not 
important. Let’s assume a firm is making a choice among projects for which 
positive results are expected and elections will somehow increase expected returns 
regardless of the election results. The firm may still postpone its investments since 
election results may change profitability rank of projects. Even positive changes 
may cause firms to postpone their investment decisions (Julio  Yook, 2012). 
Studies on the theoretical aspect have discovered an uncertain relationship 
between uncertainty and investment whereas many empirical studies have found a 
negative relationship between them (e.g. Leahy  Whited, 1996; Guiso  Parigi, 
1999). Bloom et. al. (2007) have shown that uncertainty reduces eagerness for 
investment in presence of investment opportunities. Besides, Bloom et. al. (2007) 
have shown that the effect of uncertainty on extent of investment is sensitive to 
different modeling hypotheses [such as Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983)] and the 
effect of uncertainty on eagerness for investment in presence of investment 
opportunities is strong against various hypotheses such as adjustment costs, convex 
marginal product of capital, and time-varying uncertainty (Bloom et. al. 2007).  
Badertscheret. al. (2013) have studied on whether irreversible variation among 
sectors affects the relationship between presence of public-owned corporation and 
investment sensitivity of private companies. Corporate investment decisions are 
characterized by partially depending on its degree of irreversibility in that at least, 
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investment expenses have been partially lost and therefore, if realized, they cannot 
be recovered without any cost (Pindyck, 1991). When investment decisions 
become irreversible, uncertainty makes firms more cautious and direct them to a 
wait-and-see strategy thus decreasing investment sensitivity to investment 
opportunities (Bloom et. al. 2007; Julio  Yook, 2012). 
As a type of uncertainty, political uncertaintyhas an important effect on 
corporate investment behavior. Political uncertainty may increase expected costs 
and decrease long-term investments and outputs (Jeong, 2002). Political 
uncertainty which can be expressed as political risk include thatthe possibility of 
expropriation or fund losses arising from political interference (Emir  Kurtaran, 
2005). Particularly in developing countries, typical investors react to policy 
changes and refrain from increasing their investments unless the uncertainty of 
which rationality stems from a policy reform is eliminated (Rodrik, 1991). 
Theoretical model and empirical findings of Pastor  Veronesi (2013) have shown 
that political uncertainty reduces value of protections provided by governments for 
markets and this causes more fluctuations in share prices. Julio  Yook (2012) 
have discovered that corporate investments were reduced by 4.8 % during election 
years compared to periods with no presidency elections. Durnev (2012) has 
reported that share prices liven up more during election years and this causes 
corporate investment to be insensitive to share prices. Furthermore, election 
uncertainty leads to inefficient capital allocation and jeopardizes corporate 
performance. Using Economic Policy Uncertainty Index of Baker et. al. (2013), 
Gulen  Ion (2013) have discovered that a high level of economic political 
uncertainty reduces corporate investments. 
Many studies show that policy uncertainty increases during national elections. 
For instance, Bialkowskiet. al. (2008) has shown that market indexes are more 
variable during election periods, and Boutchkovaet. al. (2012) has reported that 
sectors which are politically sensitive have less estimated cash flows again during 
election periods. Mei  Guo (2004) have discovered that stock markets were more 
variable at the time of election during the 1998 Asia financial crisis period. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
This study has benefited from panel data analysis to determine the presence of 
and if any, the direction and extent of a statistical significant relationship between 
political uncertainty and investment decisions of firms. Panel data combine time 
series and horizontal cross-sectional data, and consist of data sets regarding the 
same units with different time intervals (Baltagi, 2005; Hasio, 2002). The method 
of estimating economic relations using cross-sectional series with time dimension 
is called the panel data analysis. Therefore, panel data analysis allows investigation 
of the relationship between variables of many firms or firm groups for a given 
period. 
This study investigates the effect of political uncertainty on investment 
decisions of BIST listed firms displaying activity in the industrial sector. In 
estimation of the effects in question, quarterly panel data series of Turkey for the 
2008:1-2013:1 period were used. This study uses asset growth rate, fixed asset 
growth rate, tangible fixed asset growth rate, and inventory growth rate 
representing the investment of each firm as dependent variables.  Election data 
used as a representative of political uncertainty were provided from High Council 
for Elections, data regarding firm-specific variables were provided from Public 
Disclosure Platform, and macroeconomic data were provided from Central Bank of 
Turkey. 
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The static model that was built based on models used by Wang et. al. (2014), 
Munoz (2013), Badertscheret. al. (2013), Gulen  Ion (2013), and Julio Yook 
(2012) in their studies is as follows:  
 
INVESTit=αt+β1POLITICALUNCERTAINTYit+β2FIRMit+β3MACROit+uit+εi  
i = 1, . . . , N;  t = 1, . . . , T         (1) 
 
In models, i and t denotes country and time periods respectively and εi denotes 
the error term. INVESTit is a dependent variable and this study uses asset growth 
rate, fixed asset growth rate, tangible fixed asset growth rate, and inventory growth 
rate representing the investment of each firm as dependent variables. POLITICAL 
UNCERTAINTYit represents ELECTION, ELECTION 2009, ELECTION 2010, and 
ELECTION 2011 variables respectively. FIRMit variable represents Tobin Q value, 
asset profitability rate (ROA), following Baltacı (2014), Erkoçak  Çam (2015) 
indicators for probability in a firm, ROA. We use also net profit variance over five 
years; firm sales size, leverage rate, and cash flow variables which are included in 
the models as firm-specific variables, whereas MACROit represents economic 
growth and real interest rate variables which are used in the models as 
macroeconomic variables. 
This study uses asset growth rate, fixed asset growth rate, tangible fixed asset 
growth rate, and inventory growth rate representing the investment of each firm as 
dependent variables. Independent variables used in the study are political 
uncertainty variables, firm-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. Table 








∆AK Assetst – Assetst-1 / Assetst-1 
∆DV Fixed Assetst – Fixed Assetst-1 / Fixed Assetst-1 
∆MDV 
Tangible Fixed Assetst – Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 / Tangible 
Fixed Assetst-1 









The dummy variable representing 29 March 2009 General 
Local Elections, 12 September 2010 New Constitution 
Referendum and 12 June 2011 General Elections. 1 was 





Total Liabilities + (Number of Shares * share price) / Total 
Assets 
ROA Net profit / Total assets 
VNKM 
Net sales variance based on periods consisting of five 
quarters 
SIZE Natural logarithm of net sales representing firm sizes 
LEVERAGE 
Market based leverage rate: Total Liabilities / Total 
Liabilities + (Number of Shares * share price) 
CASH HOLDING Current Assets / Short-term Liabilities 
SALES GROWTH Net Sales – Net Salest-1 / Net Salest-1 
CASH FLOW 
(Profit before interest and tax + Depreciation – Financing 






Economic growth rate 
REAL INTEREST 
RATE 
Weighted average of interest rates applied for commercial 
credits given by banks - inflation rate 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Empirical results of the study can be handled in two parts as general statistics 
regarding variables and panel regression analysis results. 
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4.1. General Statistics Regarding Variables 
Before reviewing panel data estimation results of the model, some descriptive 
statistics of dependent and independent variables used in panel data analysis are 
provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables                            Obs.  Mean     St. Dev.      Min.           Max.  
∆AK 3087 0.485 15.527 -1.00 48.87 
∆MDV 3087 0.523 15.214 -2.32 18.11 
∆DV 3087 0.389 28.553 -1.00 28.83 
∆S 3087 0.293 38.59 -1.01 9.99 
TOBINQ  3087 5.204 35.412 0.098 45.11 
ROA 3087 0.008 0.216 -8.447 1.855 
VNKM 3087 5.528 98.775 0 2430.72 
SIZE 3087 7.955 0.887 4.792 10.672 
LEVERAGE  3087 0.653 0.258 0.001 1,000 
CASH HOLDING 3087 3.620 87.308 0.005 4851.58 
SALES GROWTH 3087 0.434 15.127 -0.691 8.13 
CASH FLOW 3087 3.268 21.865 -15.424 321.719 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 3087 0.011 0.090 -0.141 0.170 
REAL INTEREST RATE 3087 0.107 0.045 0.002 0.187 
 
As it can be seen in Table 2, firms within the sample have made investments 
with a rate of 48.5 % in terms of total assets, 52.3 % in terms of tangible fixed 
assets, 38.9 % in terms of fixed assets, and 29.3 % in terms of inventories on 
average. Mean TOBINQ of assets of these firms which is known as book value of 
assets of market value is 5.2. Besides, average return on assets of these firms is 0.8 
% on average, leverage rate is 65.3 % on average and net sales growth is 43.4 % on 
average. 
4.2. Panel Data Analysis Results 
Static panel data results are given below. The decision on whether random 
effects approach or fixed effects approach will be used in the analysis has been 
given based on results of Hausman (1979; 1981) test. 
 


































































































FIXED 2.8735*** 2.8864*** 2.8893*** 2.8383*** 
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(0.8279) (0.8269) (0.8258) (0.8336) 
R2 0.041 0.048 0.045 0.045 
Wald Chi2 Test 35.12 35.21 35.33 34.60 
Wald Chi2 Test 
probability 











Baltagi-Wu LBI 2.024 2.024 2.025 2.025 
Number of Observations 3087 3087 3087 3087 
Number of Groups 147 147 147 147 
Notes:*, **, *** show statistical significance at a level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %respectively. Values in 
brackets show standard errors. 
 
Hypotheses in Hausman test are in the following form:   
H0: E(εit  |Xit) = 0 effects of cross-sectional data and time series are random 
H1: E(εit  |Xit) = 0 effects of cross-sectional data and time series are fixed  
 
The following tables show results of the Hausman test which was conducted to 
investigate whether the difference between fixed effects model estimators and 
random effects model parameter estimators is statistically significant or not. A 
probability of less than 5% that was obtained as a result of Hausman test statistics 
indicates that random effects model would not be suitable and instead fixed effects 
model should be preferred. As a result of Hausman test statistics, fixed effects 
model was preferred for all models. Besides, since an autocorrelation problem was 
encountered for all models, AR(1) process was executed and autocorrelation was 
eliminated from the models.  
Table 3 shows outcomes of the investment model with alternative dependent 
variable. Analysis results show that for all four models (Model 1a, Model 1b, 
Model 1c and Model 1d), political uncertainties affect firm investments negatively 
and statistically significantly at a level of 10 %. Based on this result, it is possible 
to say that firms behave more cautiously in making use of investment opportunities 
during election periods, and they postpone or modulate their investment decisions 
until uncertainty with regard to elections is eliminated. This validates the political 
uncertainty hypothesis and it is also consistent with the “bad news principle” of 
Bernanke (1983) in that uncertainty increases the value of waiting for investment. 
An increase in uncertainty will cause a decrease in current investments if a bad 
outcome is likely. As suggested by Bloom et. al. (2007) and Julio Yook (2012), 
when investment decisions become irreversible, uncertainty makes firms more 
cautious and direct them to the “wait-and-see” strategy thus validates the argument 
that this reduces investment sensitivity to investment opportunities. Such negative 
effect has been observed in all alternative investment models. In other words, it is 
possible to say that during election periods, firms reduce their total assets, tangible 
fixed assets, fixed assets and inventory investments which is also consistent with 
findings of Julio Yook (2012), and Durnev (2012). A similar result was observed 
by Gulen  Ion (2013) who used the political uncertainty index instead of 
elections.  
All model outcomes show that TOBINQ and CASH FLOW variables affect firm 
investments positively and statistically significantly.  These results mean that firms 
with investment and growth opportunities make more investments. This is 
supported by studies of Wang et. al. (2014), Badertscheret. al. (2013), Gulen  Ion 
(2013), Julio  Yook (2012), and Durnev (2012) who obtained similar results. 
In most of the models, the firm’s net profit margin variance (VNKM) variable 
which was included in the models as a measure of firm uncertainty is shown to 
affect firm investments negatively and statistically significantly. These results 
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indicate that the high level of profit uncertainty or in other words uncertain future 
of firm profits or the involved risk reduces firm investments. This shows that firms 
postpone their investment decisions under uncertainty. In other words, this finding 
indicates that firms lacking profit with a steady trend reduce their investments. 
Likewise, Leahy  Whited (1996), Guiso  Parigi (1999), and Gulen  Ion (2013) 
have discovered a negative relationship between firm level uncertainty and 
investments. 
All model outcomes show that rate of return on assets (ROA) which is used in 
this study as a measure of firm profitability affects firm investments positively and 
statistically significantly.  This means that firms with a high level of profitability 
tend to make more investments. Based on this result, it is possible to say that firms 
use an important portion of their profits in financing their investments, which is 
also validated by similar results found by Badertscheret. al. (2013), and Gulen  
Ion (2013). 
Analysis results indicate that the SALES GROWTH variable which is used in 
most of the models in the study representing sales stability and demand level 
expected in the future affects firm investments positively and statistically 
significantly.  Based on these results, it is possible to say that firms increase their 
investments when they have steady sales or an expected future demand is present; 
in other words, they increase their investments relying on cash flows they will 
obtain from their sales. Wang et. al. (2014), Badertscheret. al. (2013), Julio  
Yook (2012), and Durnev (2012) have obtained a similar result. 
All model outcomes show that the SIZE variable affects firm investments 
negatively and statistically significantly. These results can be interpreted as 
follows: Big firms make less investment since they have reached their optimal 
sizes, whereas small ones make more investments so as to take advantage of their 
optimal scale sizes. That is to say, firms which have reached an optimal size have 
the opportunity to make production with a lower unit cost taking advantage of their 
scale size at optimal production amount. Firms which desire to make use of this 
opportunity can be expected to make more investment. We consider the fact that 
firms without economies of scale make more investment as a rational behavior. A 
similar relationship was found by Badertscheret. al. (2013), Gulen  Ion (2013), 
Julio  Yook (2012), and Durnev (2012). 
All model outcomes show that the LEVERAGE variable representing the capital 
structure of a firm affects firm investments negatively and statistically 
significantly. This result indicates that firms with a high leverage and therefore a 
high level of financial risk behave more cautiously in making use of investment 
opportunities. When firms which have reached an optimal capital structure level 
make investments through getting into debts, resource cost increases and earnings 
per share reduce. This negative situation means that such firm could not make use 
of the positive effect of leverage and therefore it suffers from adverse effect of 
leverage. Based on this point, for firms with a high level of getting into debt or in 
other words, for firms which finance their existing investments through more loan 
capital instead of their equity capital, intensive usage of loan capital in their new 
investments may decrease investment efficiency. This expectation applies for firms 
within scope of the sample in this study. Wang et. al. (2014), Badertscheret. al. 
(2013), and Durnev (2012) have obtained a similar result.  
A statistically significant relationship between the CASH HOLDING variable 
which was used in the study as a measure of cash policies of firms, and firm 
investments could not be determined in any model. This shows that the expectation 
regarding firms holding more cash resources will make less investment is not 
satisfied.  
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This result also shows outcomes of investment model with macroeconomic 
control variable. According to analysis results, a statistically significant 
relationship between the ECONOMIC GROWTH variable and firm investments 
could not be determined. However, a negative and statistically significant 
relationship was found between the REAL INTEREST RATE variable and firm 
investments. Based on this, it is possible to say that since a decrease in borrowing 
rate of interest reduces resource cost, firms consider the decrease in real interest 
rates as positive in terms of making use of investment opportunities, and they 
increase investments. Since an increase in real interest rates also increases 
investment costs, it is possible that firms tend to postpone investments since firm 
decision makers have a concern about not achieving the rate of return they expect.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Although there are many studies on relationship of political factors with real 
economy, asset prices, capital markets and financial risks, only a few numbers of 
studies have investigated the effect of political uncertainty on investment decisions 
of firms. The contribution of this study can be summarized as follows: A literature 
review did not return a study on effects of political uncertainty in Turkey on 
investment decisions of firms in terms of firms. The current study aims to fill a gap 
in the literature regarding how political uncertainty within the context of national 
elections affects investment decisions in terms of firms. 
This study aims to investigate the effect of political uncertainty on investment 
decisions of firms. For this purpose, this study involves 147 BIST listed firms 
displaying activity in the industry sector between 2008 and 2013. The relation 
between these variables have been analyzed using panel data analysis with relevant 
quarterly data which take time dimension of the series into account along with their 
cross-section dimension.  This study has benefited from panel data analysis to 
determine the presence of and if any, the direction and extent of a statistical 
significant relationship between political uncertainty and investment decisions of 
firms. This study uses asset growth rate, fixed asset growth rate, tangible fixed 
asset growth rate, and inventory growth rate representing the investment of each 
firm as dependent variables. Independent variables used in the study are political 
uncertainty variables, firm-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. 
Analysis results indicate that political uncertainties affect firm investments 
negatively and statistically significantly. Analysis results have revealed a 
significant relationship between investments of firms and the variable representing 
29 March 2009 General Local Elections, 12 June 2011 General Elections and 12 
September 2010 New Constitution Referendum as an indicator of political 
uncertainty. Based on this result, it is possible to say that firms behave more 
cautiously in making use of investment opportunities during election periods and 
they postpone or modulate their investment decisions until uncertainty with regard 
to elections is eliminated. This validates the political uncertainty hypothesis. This 
result is also consistent with the “bad news principle” of Bernanke (1983) in that 
uncertainty increases the value of waiting for investment. An increase in 
uncertainty will cause a decrease in current investments if a bad outcome is likely. 
As suggested by Bloom et. al. (2007) and Julio  Yook (2012), when investment 
decisions become irreversible, uncertainty makes firms more cautious and direct 
them to the “wait-and-see” strategy thus validates the argument that this reduces 
investment sensitivity to investment opportunities. Such negative effect has been 
observed in all alternative investment models. In other words, it is possible to say 
that during election periods, firms reduce their total assets, tangible fixed assets, 
fixed assets and inventory investments which is also consistent with findings of 
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Kurtaran (2007), Julio  Yook (2012), and Durnev (2012). A similar result was 
observed by Gulen  Ion (2013) who used the political uncertainty index instead 
of elections. 
Analysis results also shows outcomes of investment model with macroeconomic 
control variable. According to analysis results, a statistically significant 
relationship between the ECONOMIC GROWTH variable and firm investments 
could not be determined. However, a negative and statistically significant 
relationship was found between the REAL INTEREST RATE variable and firm 
investments. Based on this, it is possible to say that since a decrease in borrowing 
rate of interest reduces resource cost, firms consider the decrease in real interest 
rates as positive in terms of making use of investment opportunities, and they 
increase investments. Since an increase in real interest rates also increases 
investment costs, it is possible that firms tend to postpone investments since firm 
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